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Abstract

The Poor Law Reform Act of 1834 sought to change the organization and basis of English poor
relief policy. Central to the New Poor Law was the use of the workhouse test to eliminate outdoor relief
for the able-bodied. Workhouses were large, centralized institutions for housing and feeding paupers.
The workhouse test was a simple administrative device: when an individual applied for poor relief,
officials could make relief conditional on entering the workhouse. While the reasons for adoption of the
New Poor Law itself have been widely debated, historians have paid little attention to the workhouse test
itself. On the face of it the workhouse test seems odd. Authorities could have made relief less attractive
in a number of ways; why construct large, new institutions whose cost savings would be realized only
in the future, if at all? We show first that the workhouse test played an important informational role,
distinguishing between those the Poor Law wanted to support and those it did not. We further argue that
the New Poor Law faced great difficulty in convincing the poor that the reforms were real and
permanent. Construction of workhouses had two distinct functions: they acted as a signal of toughness,
and also credibly committed the relief authorities to a new regime in poor relief.
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I. Introduction

In 1834 England adopted a set of reforms to its poor-relief system that sought to overturn a
system dating back to the time of Elizabeth I. Local parishes under the old system granted outdoor relief
to a\ ·.1e class of persons, including able-bodied workers, and did so in may forms, including in-kind
grants, cash, and several forms of wage supplements. The 1834 reforms, collectively referred to as the
New Poor Law, established large administrative units beholden to a central authority and attempted to
abolish outdoor relief for the able-bodied. Central to the New Poor Law was the infamous workhouse
test. Those in the workhouse were maintained in deliberately unpleasant conditions. Relief officials
could not refuse to grant relief to a poor person, but they could "offer the house" which meant requiring
that the applicant enter the workhouse to obtain relief.
Our objective in this paper is to develop the logic behind this test, trying to understand why the
framers of the New Poor Law put so much weight on a particular institutional mechanism. We take as
given the Royal Commission's identification of the problems affecting the Old Poor law. 1 Our intention
is not to explain why England reformed its poor relief system in 1834 rather than earlier or later. We
also avoid taking a position on the related and equally complex issue of whether the Old Poor Law was
as bad as its critics claimed. 2 Despite our narrowness of purpose, however, we believe that the question
of institutional choice for the framers of the New Poor Law is important and insufficiently appreciated
in the considerable literature on this landmark reform.
The adoption of the workhouse test seems often to be viewed as synonymous with hardening
attitudes towards the poor which many argue characterize this period of English history. However, it is
important to realize that there is no necessary connection between these two. Moreover, there existed
alternatives to the workhouse test, discussed below, which on the face of it appeared to achieve many of
the same objectives. Our analysis of the adoption of the workhouse test emphasizes the centrality of

information problems in the context of designing an adequate system of poor relief and the importance
of establishing credibility in the reform of the system.Thus the workhouse test was not adopted simply because changes in attitudes led the authorities
to prefer a more cruel policy, as some previous historians have suggested. Rather, it could be viewed
as a reasonable way to deal with the problems that the Royal Commission identified in the Old Poor Law.
The contemporary critique of the Old Poor Law emphasized informational constraints especially; even
honest relief officials could not distinguish those who merited relief from those who did not, and the
system left considerable scope for corruption. The workhouse test played an important informational
role, helping relief officials to distinguish those they wanted to assist from those they did not.

In

addition, the New Poor Law, like any new policy, faced difficulties in convincing the poor that it was
really serious about reform. We argue that workhouse construction helped officials to demonstrate their
seriousness about reform.
The next section provides some historical background on the Old and New Poor Laws. Section
III "defends" the workhouse test as the most practical way to achieve reformers' goals of providing relief
at reasonable fiscal cost. Section IV considers some of the workhouse test's drawbacks, and section V
provides a brief conclusion.

II. Historical Background

11.1 The Old Poor Law

There were three key features to the Old Poor Law: decentralization, discretion and voluntarism.
It was decentralized because relief was administered by some 15,000 parishes ranging in size from 30
acres to 30 square miles, and in population from several dozen to many thousands of persons; over 1900
parishes had fewer than 100 persons in 1831, while 128 parishes had populations of 10,000 or more
(Blaug (1963: 156-157); Royal Commission (1834: 104-5). Poor relief was a statutory right for any pauper
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who was deemed to be deserving, but local officials had broad latitude over the amounts and types of
relief they granted. Funding for the Old Poor Law was also entirely local, relying on a tax on land and
buildings. Through the law of settlement, which made each parish legally responsible for the relief of
those "settled" in the parish, every parish bore the burden of support for its poor.
We refer to it as discretionary because of the wide variety of methods parishes used to deal with
their paupers. The framers of the New Poor Law objected most to the widespread use of outdoor relief
- grants of food or cash to paupers who remained in their own homes - but the parochial system gave
free rein to the "obstinate diversity of parochial practice" (Digby (1982:7)). Some parishes had even
erected workhouses on their own while others amalgamated for the purpose of constructing a workhouse,
taking advantage of provisions in Gilbert's Act (1782). 3 More common, however, were outdoor relief,
as well as wage subsidies and employment guarantees. The Speenhamland system common in many
southern English parishes during the early nineteenth century used elaborate bread-price scales to
determine relief (Blaug (1963: 161-2)). Because parishes could decide on the type and generosity ofrelief
they offered, the years prior to the introduction of the New Poor Law saw great local variation in the
number of paupers per capita. Southern England, as a rule, was most "pauperized," while northern
parishes usually had considerably fewer paupers per capita.
The Old Poor Law's reliance on unpaid local personnel for its administration marked a third
significant feature of the system, its voluntarism. Relief was one of several responsibilities for the parish
vestry or church council. The vestry usually selected a local ratepayer to serve as an unpaid "overseer
of the poor" to deal with day-to-day matters. Thus the relief system was operated by a semi-voluntary,
non-professional corps of locals. Disgruntled relief applicants could always appeal to the local justice
of the peace, who could compel the overseer to grant relief.

3

11.2 The New Poor Law and the Workhouse Test
Complaints about the Old Poor Law led Parliament to appoint several bodies to inquire into its
workings during the early nineteenth century. The most famous, the Royal Commission on the Poor
Laws, was appointed in 1832 and its recommendations formed the basis for the 1834 Act. 4

The

proposed law introduced a system of poor relief that was centralized, based on strict adherence to
eligibility rules and run on more professional administration.
The degree of centralization envisaged in the 1834 Act was unprecedented in English local
government. A Poor Law Board consisting of three commissioners had the power to compel local relief
officials to adhere to their dictates. The local administration of relief was also changed.

The Act

established Poor Law Unions administered by elected officials called Guardians. Unions were large units
formed by combining parishes; eventually the 15,000 parishes of England were combined into some 600
Poor Law Unions.

The Unions were at first administrative rather than taxing districts.

In 1865

Parliament strengthened the role of the Poor Law Union by introducing Union chargeability, which meant
that all poor rates were levied on the Poor Law Union as a whole. Prior to 1865 each parish within a
Union paid for the relief of its own paupers plus a share of the workhouse maintenance costs that was
based on the number of paupers it had in the past (Brundage (1978: 184), MacKinnon (1987)).
The 1832 Commission's primary recommendation was that the able-bodied and their families be
henceforth granted poor relief only in workhouses, under conditions "less eligible" than the working poor.
Workhouses were large facilities built and maintained by the Poor Law Union and staffed with more or
less professional employees. Less eligibility was accomplished not only by making workhouse inmates
labor, but by enforcing a strict regime of waking hours, limiting inmates to a monotonous diet, and
forbidding small pleasures such as tobacco. The idea was to provide for basic material needs while
nonetheless making a self-supporting life outside the workhouse preferable to the working poor. "The
cruelty of the workhouse did not reside in its material deprivation but in its psychological harshness.

4

Indeed, the Poor Law Commissioners themselves appreciated that it was through psychological rather than
material deterrence that the workhouse test would operate (Digby (1982: 17)). An important component
11

of workhouse administration, at least as advocated by the Poor Law Board, was the "classification" or
separation of paupers by age, sex, and health status. This separation was held to improve workhouse
functioning and to reduce the chance of "immoral behavior within the institution. Separation also
II

advanced the cause of less eligibility by effectively denying family members contact with one another. 5
Workhouse advocates usually saw labor as part of the discipline of the institution rather than as a means
to reduce relief costs, although some Unions made heavy use of inmate labor for running the institution. 6
The phrase "less eligible" means that paupers would have a level of well-being less than that of
the working poor. The effort to distinguish between the poor and the indigent was a central focus of the
1832 report and the New Poor Law itself. Once Unions were created, the Poor Law Commissioners
began to negotiate agreements prohibiting outdoor relief for the able-bodied, and other elements of the
program. These individual agreements were later consolidated into a general Outdoor Relief Prohibitory
Order. As of December 1844, when the order was promulgated, it applied to 465 Unions - nearly 90
percent of all Unions then in existence (DeSchweinitz (1947:134)).

Neither the original Poor Law

Commission nor its successors, the Poor Law Board (1847) and the Local Government Board (1871),
succeeded in gaining full compliance with the edicts of the central authority. Guardians retained sufficient
autonomy and knowledge of loopholes to grant outdoor relief when they wished; the Outdoor Relief
Prohibitory Order itself allowed exceptions in case of "sudden and urgent necessity.

11

Per-pauper costs for outdoor relief were much lower than for indoor relief. Outdoor relief grants
were normally not given unless the person had other resources; that is, they were not intended to be the
pauper's entire support. In addition, the workhouse was a permanent institution, implying construction
and maintenance costs as well as a staff. The difference between per-pauper outdoor and indoor relief
costs varied over time and from place to place. Rent and wages being large components of workhouse
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costs, they were especially expensive in cities. MacKinnon estimates that outdoor relief costs in the late
1860s averaged £2.5 to £5.5 per pauper per annum, while indoor relief costs averaged £5.5 to £20 per
pauper per annum (MacKinnon (1987:608)).
Poor relief became extremely costly during the Napoleonic Wars of the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, and continued to climb even after the peace. Poor rates rose on average by 62
percent from 1802-3 to 1832-3. These tax increases far outstripped the gross rentals from farm land on
which poor relief assessments primarily fell; rentals increased by only 25 percent over the same period
(Digby (1982:9)). Table 1 summarizes the numbers on relief and costs of relief for the period between
1840 and World War I.

The New Poor Law's immediate fiscal impact is unclear; while total

expenditures on poor relief fell by one-third between 1834 and 1837, part of the reduction must be
attributed to a combination of strong labor demand and low food prices (DeSchweinitz (1947: 130)). In
the longer term the New Poor Law did achieve reductions in outdoor relief, although much of the
reduction followed the Crusade Against Outrelief of the 1870s (MacKinnon (1985)). Total relief costs
grew, but more slowly than national income; income per capita nearly doubled between 1841 and 1901,
while poor relief costs per capita increased only about 20 percent. The Poor Law remained in force until
the 1940s but it gradually lost its functions to other programs and bodies. During the late nineteenth
century medical relief and the care of the insane became increasingly distinct from the Poor Law. Later
Acts supplanted parts of the relief system with social insurance schemes. 7

III. Understanding the Workhouse Test

To understand the appeal of the workhouse to the framers of the New Poor Law we must
appreciate their critique of the Old Poor Law. The new system's advocates clearly wanted to reduce costs
by reducing generosity of relief. Yet the Royal Commission identified two constraints on any relief
system. First, few serious people advocated abolishing relief altogether. 8 The New Poor Law had to
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assist all who were truly destitute.

Second, the new system had to find a way to overcome the

administrative deficiencies of the Old Poor Law. We shall see that, in reformer's eyes, the workhouse
test offered a way to reduce pauperism, and costs, without violating either constraint.

111.1 :· ~oblems with the Old Poor Law

The Royal Commission's critique of the pauperized parishes under the Old Poor Law had at its
heart two problems: many of those who received relief were not really destitute, and many who were
destitute had become so by their own fault - by failing to work and save, by drinking, etc. The Royal
Commission's complaint can be made more concrete by adopting some terminology and ideas from Besley
and Coate (1992b). Those who are poor at any point in time can be divided into two categories: the
needy and the non-needy. The needy require public support in order to achieve an acceptable minimum
standard of living; their current assets and work opportunities are not enough. The non-needy are those
who, due to labor market opportunities, more savings, wealthier families, etc., have access to sufficient
resources to be self-supporting. The needy can be divided into two further types, the deserving and
undeserving. The deserving are needy through no fault of their own. The undeserving, on the other
hand, could have avoided their predicament by working harder, saving more, avoiding drink, etc.
The Royal Commission claimed that under the Old Poor Law many relief recipients were not

needy, and that many of those who were needy were undeserving. Most of what the Royal Commission
viewed as the Old Poor Law's ills amount to this leakage of benefits from the deserving to those who
were either non-needy or undeserving. In her influential history of thought Himmelfarb has argued the
desire to distinguish those who should get relief from those who should not underlay the entire reform
effort:
To this end, the 'dispauperizing' of the poor, the commission sought to create a 'broad line of
distinction between the class of independent labourers and the class of paupers.' The whole of
the report was, in effect, an exercise in definition and distinction, an attempt to establish that line
theoretically and to maintain it institutionally. Each of the 'remedial measures' was intended to
7

make the social reality accord with the principle, to separate pauper and poor in practice just as
they were separated by definition. Contemporaries quarreled about the justice and wisdom of
these measures, and historians have quarreled about the evidence upon which the theory was
based. To a certain extent both issues are beside the point. The heart of the matter was in the
distinction between pauper and poor. Once that was conceded, the rest fell into place
(Himmelfarb (1985: 163)).
The Old Poor Law's over-generosity was undesirable on several grounds. Obviously, extending
benefits to those who did not need or deserve them raised the system's cost. Other complaints about the
Old Poor Law can be traced to the same source.

Consider Malthus' complaint that the Poor Law

encouraged "early and improvident marriages" among the poor because they knew they if they ever could
not support their families, the Poor Law would. This complaint amounts to saying that the Poor Law
supported the undeserving, people who could have avoided poverty by not marrying and having children.
Another widespread complaint was that poor relief reduced labor supply by discouraging work effort.
Again, this complaint amounts to saying that the Poor Law was relieving the non-needy. Finally, the
Royal Commission seemed quite bothered by the idea that the Poor Law discouraged the respect and
deference that the poor should have for the wealthy. That, too, amounts to granting relief to an over
broad class of people. 9
The Royal Commission emphasized the problem of information in restricting relief to the right
people: information on relief applicants was either unavailable at all, costly to acquire and use, or not
trustworthy when available. Investigating applications to identify who was needy under the Old Poor Law
was often a thankless task. Applicants resented intruding questions and the official knew that in most
cases the applicant did his or her best to hide some assets or other important details. And, explicitly or
implicitly, the time spent on investigating relief claims was costly. Just how costly depended on the social
context of the relief apparatus. In a parish of several hundred people the poor were likely to be well
known to those in charge of the relief system; members of the vestry knew who did and did not have
employment, who was unable to work, etc. In other contexts - a larger parish, more immigration, etc.
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- gathering information could be more costly; Some information, furthermore, was in principal not
available unless the applicant and the relief official had lived in the same place all their lives.
The information available might also be suspect, as the Royal Commission emphasized. Since
parish relief officials were unpaid, one need not be entirely cynical to suspect that those who were willing
to do the job had ulterior motives. One writer noted that overseers were "taken from the shopkeeping
or farming class, and served not even for a year but for six, three, or even two months ... The office was
disagreeable, unpopular, and unpaid, and specially obnoxious to busy men" (Fowle (1898:77)). Those
who knew the poor well could profit from abuse of the Poor Law: 10
What our evidence does show is, that where the administration of relief is brought nearer to the
door of the pauper, little advantage arises from increasing knowledge on the part of the
distributors, and great evil from their increased liability to every sort of pernicious influence.
It brings tradesmen within the influence of their customers, small farmers within that of their
relations and connexions, and not infrequently of those who have been their fellow workmen ...
(Royal Commission (1834:276-77)).
The information required to prevent leakage under a system such as the Old Poor Law was either costly
or not available at all; and even when available, that information brought with it the distinct possibility
of corruption.
Parochial administration created another set of problems. Property holders liable to pay rates in
more than one parish found it difficult to exercise any voice in the way their tax monies were used. The
huge disparities in taxable property and in poverty among the several parishes often resulted in situations
in which the near-poor in one poor parish were taxed heavily to support their poor neighbors, while in
a nearby parish the near-absence of paupers meant very light poor relief taxes on the wealthy. The
system of settlement was also exacerbated by the small parish sizes. To the extent settlement laws
deterred migration, as many critics argued, the small sizes of parishes discouraged even very short
moves. And the parochial system offered relatively wealthy parishes the opportunity to employ workers
settled in a neighboring parish, but then force that parish to support the worker in case of illness or
injury. Fowle noted that the "larger and wealthier parishes, on the one hand, the landowners on the
9

other, reaped the advantage of the labour of workpeople, and then devised the law of settlement as an
excuse for passing them back to their own parishes in age or sickness" (Fowle (1898:45)). The Royal
Commission found that rates could vary widely across parishes within the same county. For example,
in Buckinghamshire in 1831, twelve small parishes had an average rate of £1.2 per head of population,
while the twelve largest had a rate of £.58 per head (Royal Commission (1834:316)).

111.2 Was the Workhouse Test a Natural Response?
The workhouse test could directly address many of the concerns of would-be reformers and as
such appeared like a natural response to information problems. 11 The test could distinguish between the
needy and non-needy, and with time would reduce the proportion of needy paupers who could have
avoided their situation. The workhouse test distinguished the needy from the non-needy by screening.
If the applicant really was needy, then he or she would accept the offer of a place in the workhouse;
otherwise not. Screening is essentially static; it distinguishes those who are needy from those who are
not at a point in time and does not, therefore, pertain to the Poor Law's efforts to alter the characteristics
of relief recipients. In the first few years after the New Poor Law's enactment, most of the reduction
in applications should be traced to the screening function, since the non-needy now knew they stood no
chance of outdoor relief.
Screening was necessary only because obtaining information on the state of the poor required
costly and potentially acrimonious and fraudulent investigation. The workhouse test dispensed with all
investigation. By accepting or declining the workhouse, the applicant in effect told the Guardians whether
he or she was needy:
The offer of relief on the principle suggested by us would be a self-acting test of the claim of the
applicant... By the means which we propose, the line between those who do, and those who do
not, need relief is drawn, and drawn perfectly. If the claimant does not comply with the terms
on which relief is given to the destitute, he gets nothing; and if he does comply, the compliance
proves the truth of the claim namely, his destitution (Royal Commission (1834:264)).

10

Polanyi agreed with this interpretation, although he viewed its operation as less benign: "It was now left
to the applicant to decide whether he was so utterly destitute of all means that he would voluntarily repair
to a shelter which was deliberately made into a place of horror" (Polanyi (1944: 101-2)). Screening even
worked in cases where the relevant information was beyond the applicant's knowledge.

Reluctant

relatives were always a problem. Asking a pauper's relatives whether they were willing to support him
or her might bring a predictable response; but putting such a person in the workhouse would bring forth
a more honest reply:
It is, I believe, within the experience of many Boards of Guardians, that there are persons who,
while in prosperous circumstances, readily permit their aged relatives to receive out-relief, an
offer of in-door relief is frequently found to put pressure upon them to rescue themselves, if not
their relatives, from the discredit incident to the residence of the latter in the Workhouse (Royal
Commission (1834:188)).
The workhouse's deterrent function was not to distinguish the deserving from the undeserving
- the workhouse was open to all, deserving or not - but to change poor people's incentives so that in
the future, fewer would require relief. In using the phrase "deterrent workhouse" the historiography of
the New Poor Law usually means that a more harsh poor relief system would lead to fewer applicants
for relief. We use the term here in a narrower sense. Deterrence refers here only to the effect on
behavior of potential paupers who increase their attempts to avoid poverty because of the workhouse test.
The difference in the well-being of an independent laborer and an indoor pauper is a measure of the
incentive to avoid ending up in the position of the latter. This use of the term accords with that of the
authors of the 1832 Report: if individuals become poor at least in part because of decisions they make
with respect to poverty-reducing investments (savings, work skills, etc.) - and the Royal Commission
clearly thought so - then the number of paupers at any one time reflects, in part, the generosity of relief:
Wherever inquiries have been made as to the previous condition of the able-bodied individuals
who live in such numbers on the town parishes, it has been found that the pauperism of the
greatest number has originated in indolence, improvidence, or vice, and might have been averted
by ordinary care and industry (Royal Commission (1834:264)).

11

By tailoring relief to give the poor better incentives to avoid poverty, the New Poor Law could actually

reduce the incidence of poverty. Deterrence is a dynamic concept: the workhouse test would reduce
pauperism only by inducing the poor to change their behavior and so reduce their future dependence on
the poor relief system. Thus to the extent the New Poor Law reduced pauperism in its first few years,
the reduction had little to do with deterrence in our sense.
Central to the deterrent function of the test was the idea that relief officials could not know with
certainty whether a given applicant had tried to avoid poverty. Distinguishing the deserving from the
undeserving applicant required knowing whether he or she had in the past exercised ordinary care and
industry. Rather than attempt complete life histories of each applicant the workhouse test simply gave
the working poor a strong incentive to increase their efforts to avoid poverty.
The workhouse test, then, arose as a method for contending with the twin constraints of imperfect
information and the need to provide basic survival to all. 12

The workhouse met the constraint of

offering relief to all, even the undeserving, while still offering relief officials an effective way to
distinguish the needy from the non-needy, and to encourage the poor to avoid destitution. In this "self
acting test" the Royal Commission saw something approaching a panacea, a simple way to meet the Poor
Law's basic goals while avoiding all contaminants of corruption and administrative inefficiency:
If, then, regulations were established and enforced with the degree of strictness that has been
attained in the dispauperized parishes, the workhouse doors might be thrown open to all who
would enter them, and conform to the regulations ... no agency for contending against fraudulent
rapacity and perjury, no stages of appeal, (vexatious to the appellants and painful to the
magistrates,) [would] be requisite to keep the able-bodied from the parish (Royal Commission
(1834:264)).

111.3 Possible Alternatives to the Workhouse Test

On the face of it the workhouse test appears to be a rather cumbersome instrument for
accomplishing the twin objectives of reducing leakage to the non-needy and reducing the number of
undeserving paupers. The workhouse test required a huge investment in infrastructure before the program
12

could be properly implemented.

Indeed, as Mackinnon (1987) has shown, indoor relief was more

expensive (per pauper) than outdoor relief. To illustrate why workhouses would still be worthwhile, we
consider the workhouse test in comparison with two alternatives. One alternative was actually used in
British Colonial relief systems and by some Unions under the New Poor Law. The second alternative
amou. ; to a tightening of the rules under the Old Poor Law.
The workhouse was not the only way to make receiving poor relief unpleasant. British colonial
administrators relied on rural public works without the formal structure of workhouses to provide famine
relief. The basis of this system was a labor test similar to the workhouse test; applicants could receive
relief only if they agreed to work. Even after the promulgation of the Outdoor Relief Prohibitory Order,
several Poor Law Unions relied on a labor test rather than a workhouse test. 13 Some of the New Poor
Law's opponents noted that a labor test had some of the desirable effects attributed to the workhouse, but
did not require shutting people up in prison-like institutions (Edsall (1971: 18-19)). Why did Poor Law
reformers in England prefer the workhouse test to labor tests?
While a labor test was necessarily consistent with the twin objectives of the New Poor Law: to
screen and deter while still providing the necessities of life to those willing to take them on the Poor
Law's terms, it might not be sufficiently unpleasant to fulfill this function effectively. Even the most
intense labor as the price of relief would not be so effective as the workhouse. The workhouse's peculiar
genius was that it was both extremely unpleasant (because of the loss of liberty and the separation from
loved ones) while providing adequate material comforts.
Second, a labor test was likely to be effective for the wrong type of person; the test drew a line
not between the needy and the non-needy, but between those who could and could not do labor. Some
of the needy would not be able to work because of age or affliction. Moreover, the workhouse test
worked through primarily psychological means and thus did not screen such individuals out. Indeed, the
costs of entering the workhouse were smallest for precisely this class of paupers." One of the Royal

13

Commission's informants claimed that after introducing a workhouse system in one parish pauperism
dropped to a small number of "old, idiots, or infirm, and to whom a workhouse is really a place of
comfort. "14 Those who should not be receiving poor relief were least likely to accept the workhouse,
but perhaps most likely accept a labor test.
A third set of reasons for preferring the workhouse to a labor test stems from the reformers' need
to convince the population that relief policy really had changed: the credibility problem.

Much of

deterrence's benefit would come in the future, if at all, and depended on the poor believing that outdoor
relief for the able-bodied really was a thing of the past.

Here reformers faced a time-consistency

problem: the government might find it worthwhile to threaten a future draconian policy toward the poor
in order to re~p the advantages of deterrence today, but then not actually implement the program and so
save the additional cost of that program.

Workhouse construction could aid credibility through two

distinct mechanisms: by signalling to the poor that this reform was real and permanent, and by actually
altering the relief system's incentives to give outdoor relief in the future.
Workhouse construction could be viewed as part of a signalling strategy on behalf of reformers.
By building a workhouse the government could demonstrate to the poor that it was serious about a new
regime in poor relief. Tough governments that are really committed to reform of the poor law find it
worthwhile to offer the house; weak governments do not. Tough governments distinguish themselves
from weak governments through constructing workhouses.

For workhouse construction to serve as

signalling device, it must be true that weak governments find their construction costlier at the margin than
tough ones. 15

This might be true because workhouse construction crowds out other government

programs, for a given budget, that are valued more by the weak governments. Apfel and Dunkley make
precisely this argument in their study of the Poor Law in Bedfordshire:
... Bedfordshire's spanking-new workhouses, dotting the landscape with their 'immense size,'
stood as highly visible monuments to the frustrations of ratepayers with the social-legal obligation
of public charity and to the resolve of authority (in its various forms) to maintain social
discipline... (Apfel and Dunkley (1985:53)).
14

The signalling argument also may explain why reformers rejected the use of buildings that existed
prior to the implementation of the New Poor law. Many Poor Law Unions had at their disposal, after
amalgamation of parishes, several older institutions that could have served as buildings for housing the
poor. But the Poor Law Commissioners, after some initial indecision, insisted on construction of a large,
new, central workhouse that would house all indoor paupers in the Union. The central institution was
at some level counter-productive, since the Poor Law also wanted to physically separate different classes
of persons within the institution. Yet a new edifice would more effectively signal the government's
toughness:
It was plain that one building would be a more potent symbol of the new law than a series of
familiar parish poorhouses. The essence of the single workhouse was its novelty, its mystery,
and its formidable appearance ... This new construction, which in many rural unions would be
the largest public building, was bound to have a powerful effect on the local population. Thus
the Commissioners accepted that the large single building was itself an essential part of deterrence
(Crowther (1981:40)) (emphasis original).
Some Poor Law officials were quite explicit about this role of workhouse construction:
... the forbidding look of the new workhouses was intended as a 'terror to the able-bodied
population;' yet another remarked in 1836 that 'their prison-like appearance ... inspires a salutary
dread of them' (Driver 1993:59).
Forcing paupers to pick oakum or break stones to receive their relief was a form of less eligibility, but
it did not involve any large, obvious expenditures that enabled the government to signal a regime change.
The workhouse might also have aided credibility by altering government incentives ex post, i.e.
to choose to offer the house for a particular poor individual. Workhouse construction entailed a sunk
cost; each building was designed specially for this use, and would require substantial modification to be
used for commercial, industrial, or residential purposes should the Poor Law authorities decide to sell
it. If incurring this sunk cost made the marginal cost of indoor relief less than the marginal cost of
outdoor relief, then workhouse construction itself would have made the New Poor Law credible simply
by changing the Poor Law officials' ex post incentives to grant indoor relief. Perhaps this is what D. G.
Adey, the first assistant Poor Law commissioner for the county of Bedfordshire, had in mind when he
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claimed in 1835 that "the 'mere extent' of accommodation in union workhouses was sufficient to
intimidate the labouring poor."

The historical evidence on this point is somewhat equivocal.

MacKinnon's estimates, cited earlier, imply that each indoor pauper cost two to four times as much as
each outdoor pauper, even excluding the costs of the structure and its staff. Yet MacKinnon's estimates
are not, strictly, the marginal cost of a workhouse inmate; several important fixed costs (such as heating
and lighting) cannot be excluded from her estimates given the available information, and some other costs
(such as medical and burial expenses) are included in those figures but clearly would not apply to all
indoor paupers. 16
The introduction of the New Poor Law was greeted by significant and sometimes violent popular
opposition in much of England. Efforts to burn the new workhouse were a common form of anti-Poor
Law protest (Snell (1985: 135-136)); often the Poor Law Guardians had to provide guards for the structure
both during and after construction Digby (1978:220). Mobs had several reasons to attack the workhouse
structure, including its convenience as a target. But the focus on the workhouse also suggests some
understanding of the structure's significance as the government's visible statement that the regime had
changed.
A second way to reform the Old Poor Law without relying on workhouses would be to tighten
up the administration of the existing system. Much of what the Royal Commission complained about
amounted either to gross inattention or outright fraud. Some of the New Poor Law's critics advocated

reforming the Old Poor Law rather than introducing a new system. 17 Why not address these problems
through standard bureaucratic means - perhaps additional staff at the parish level to undertake more
thorough inquiries, and national inspectors to investigate possible fraud?

The Royal Commission

considered this possibility and explicitly rejected it. The problem with administrative means goes back
to the basic problem of information. Acquiring and using information is expensive; George Huish, an
assistant overseer in the parish of St. George's, told the Royal Commission that in his parish, with over
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2000 paupers, "it is utterly impossible to prevent considerable fraud, whatever vigilance is exercised."
Huish further claimed that proper oversight would require at least one inspector for every 100 paupers
- a cost no parish could bear. 18 We should also recall the Royal Commission's basic suspicion about
information and corruption, noted above; how long could professional overseers last without becoming
corrupted by the paupers they were intended to supervise?
The Royal Commission did not specifically claim that gathering information on the poor had
recently become more difficult. But the social and economic changes of the early nineteenth century
probably did make gathering information on the poor more problematic, and may help to. explain why
the issue came to a head in the early 1830s. This is one way to interpret Karl Polyani's famous account
of the Great Transformation. Polanyi argued that paternal relations between master and servant, farmer
and laborer, were replaced by the impersonal market relations of capitalist and wage-laborer during the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Society underwent "the displacement of 'moral economy'
by political economy. The traditional rights of the poor were being eroded, and a humane relationship
between men of different status and income was often replace by a narrower cash nexus" (Digby
(1982: 10)). Polanyi and most historians interpret this transformation as a change in attitudes; but without
really stressing it, Polanyi was describing a change in the information environment. The Elizabethan
system of poor relief was based on localized, discretionary relief, and presupposed that the relief
applicant's circumstances and past were well-known to the locals who ran the parish relief system. As
society became increasingly anonymous and market relations supplanted personal relations, the
Elizabethan system became increasingly impractical. 19

IV. Drawbacks to the Workhouse Test
Much of the New Poor Law's reputation for cruelty, especially in contrast to the Old Poor Law,
amounts to the undeniable observation that the workhouse test reduced the well-being of deserving
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paupers. That is, reliance on the workhouse test would make life harder for many who received relief
under the Old Poor Law, and who even the Royal Commission would agree should have received that
relief. Curiously, the historical literature on the New Poor Law has missed the important point that the
reduction of well-being for the deserving was a necessary consequence of using the workhouse test for
its intended aims; its advocates can be condemned for their willingness to countenance those harsh
consequences without being accused of the perversity of valuing the workhouse simply because it was
cruel. There are three analytically distinct features of the issue. One problem arose because the reform
could not grandfather individuals raised under the old system. A second problem reflected the blanket
application of the workhouse test. The third problem turns on the balance between the cost -

the

reduced well-being for the deserving - and the benefits of reduced expenditures. We discuss each of
these problems in turn.
The working classes argued in effect that the old system was one of their rights, and they resisted
the deprivation they saw in the new system. The violent reaction to this change reflects one of the
dynamic problems inherent in the workhouse's deterrent function. Some aspects of deterrence could take
effect quickly; there is no reason why a lazy man cannot commence work upon denial of outdoor relief.
But much of the behavior the workhouse test sought to deter was, by the admission of even the new
system's advocates, life-long. Consider Malthus' complaint that the Old Poor Law encourage laborers
to marry before they could support a family. One can perhaps deter a twenty year-old from marrying
young, and from not saving; but for a fifty year-old the change in rules amounts to punishment for
behavior he cannot now change. Thus much of the deterrent function was lost on those beyond early
adulthood at the time of the New Poor Law's introduction. What these older people experienced, instead,
was a pure reduction in their well-being without the opponunity to make the changes in behavior the New

Poor Law sought to encourage. Once again we see the commitment problem: the authorities could hardly
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treat the middle-age worker in 1834 with relative kindness and still expect that the younger workers, those
whose behavior they hoped to alter, would really believe that the system had changed.
A related problem concerns the identity of those whose behavior the Poor Law sought to change
versus those who would suffer because of the new policy. Consider the children of the laborers Malthus
was c "')plaining about; should the Poor Law force the children into workhouses because of their parents'
unwise marriage? At one level this is a thorny moral question; at another, it concerns how much one can
affect a man by reducing the well-being of his children. Deterrence related to families and family
formation behavior can amount to punishment of some who have no say in the behavior of those whose
behavior is supposedly subject to deterrence. James McKay, an assistant Poor Law Commissioner in
1838, advocated separate treatment for children on precisely these grounds (Driver (1993:96)). 20
The workhouse test was also inferior to a hypothetical test that was sensitive to the attempts
individuals made to avoid destitution. After all, some relief applicants were simple victims of bad luck;
they had lived lives the Royal Commission would admire only to have their means taken by accident or
illness that could not be demonstrated to the authorities. A better system would use information on the
applicant's past behavior to determine whether he really had made any effort to avoid poverty, reserving
the test for cases in doubt.

Blanket application of the workhouse test makes sense only when such

information is not available. The New Poor Law recognized this fact when it initially spared widows and
the infirm from the workhouse test, recognizing that poverty in this case was unlikely to be related to past
failure to undertake some investment.
A third feature of this drawback to the workhouse test is clearest if we adopt a more purely
utilitarian perspective. Few opponents doubted the workhouse test's ability to screen the needy from the
non-needy or to encourage people to avoid poverty in theory. Much debate over the workhouse focused
on whether the costs of reducing the well-being of the deserving poor was going to be offset by
reductions in pauperism in general. How much could any Poor Law affect savings behavior, or drinking?
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If the Poor Law could not have much effect on such behaviors, then the workhouse system forced some
paupers to bear the cost of the reduction in well-being without there being any reduction in pauperism
overall. The deterrent abilities of poor relief programs are an inherently empirical question, one that lies
at the heart of many efforts to reform welfare programs even today. 21
The effectiveness of deterrence was a central issue of contention during the New Poor Law's early
years. Many Poor Law Unions refused to build workhouses at all, often claiming that in their region all
applicants for relief were deserving, and so the workhouse test was superfluous.

This claim was

particularly common in northern industrial regions:
... less eligibility enforced through the workhouse system could not be sensibly applied to the
North, however beneficial it might prove to be in the South. When trade was good the
workpouse would be empty apart from the aged, the sick and children; when times were bad no
reasonable workhouse would be large enough to hold the mass of able-bodied factory workers
which the application of a workhouse test would bring in (Edsall (1971:48)).
Deterrence was simply ineffective for the poverty that brought relief applicants to the Poor Law in the
North. Since the workhouse could not pay any benefits in reducing the number of undeserving paupers,
it was only churlish to inflict its cost on the deserving paupers.

V. Conclusions

The framers of the New Poor Law placed great faith in the workhouse test. Many contemporaries
and modern historians, however, view the workhouse test as a cruel instrument of policy that reflected
dogmatic judgements and harsh attitudes towards the poor. This view is correct in the sense that the
workhouse test clearly reduced the well-being of deserving paupers. The Royal Commission's enthusiasm
for the test reflects their willingness to countenance this "cruelty."

Nonetheless, if we adopt the

viewpoint of those who wanted to reform the administration of poor relief in England in the 1830s, the
workhouse test has a certain logic. Targeting relief to the needy and reducing the fraction of undeserving
paupers required accurate information on who was poor and why they were poor.
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The Royal

Commission thought that information on the poor was expensive to gather and often unreliable anyway.
In these circumstances, it made sense to move to an administrative system that required less information
on the poor. The workhouse test forced applicants to reveal whether they were truly needy and gave
everyone stronger incentives to avoid poverty. Construction of workhouses also convinced the poor that
the reforms were real and permanent.
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Endnotes

1. Thus we do not pretend to explain the historical facts of the Poor Law's crisis, amendment, and
subsequent development so much as the intellectual arguments made by the Royal Commission and other
enthusiasts of the workhouse test. The literature on the New Poor Law is vast; we do not pretend to
survey it completely. Thompson (1963) and Snell (1985) see in the New Poor Law a combination of
changing attitudes toward the poor. Mandler ( 1987, 1990) stresses the political role of landlords. Polanyi
(1944) uses the New Poor Law as evidence for the new primacy of the market in human relations.
Himmelfarb (1984) places the New Poor Law in the context of intellectual developments. Thompson's
famous condemnation speaks for much of the literature: "The Act of 1834, and its subsequent
administration by men like Chadwick and Kay, was perhaps the most sustained attempt to impose an
ideological dogma, in defiance of the evidence of human need, in English history" (Thompson
(1963 :295)).
2. Several modern scholars have contended that the Old Poor Law came under attack not because of its
"abuses," but because its critics either misunderstood or objected to its central function (Blaug (1963);
McCloskey (1973); Boyer (1985,1990); Snell (1985)). We should also note - although the New Poor
Law's implementation is not our point - that the New Poor Law's framers were not able to put their
vision into practice for many years. Outdoor relief in particular remained common in cities and in some
rural regions (Boyer (1985), MacKinnon (1987)).

For our purposes, however, the difficulty of

implementing the New Poor Law is distinct from the problem of why its framers sought to reduce relief
by adopting particular institutions.
3. Gilbert's Act permitted parishes to form unions for the purpose of constructing a workhouse, bearing
obvious resemblance to the 1834 reform.
4. This legislation did not extend to Scotland or Ireland, although Ireland's Poor Law, first established
in 1838, was very similar to England's New Poor Law. Guinnane (1993) discusses the Irish Poor law.
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The Webbs note that little of the changes actually enacted were written into statutes; rather, ".. .it was
assumed that the Central Authority would put into execution the proposals of the Report of 1834.
Parliament contented itselfwith giving the Central Authority wide powers and almost unfettered discretion
in the use of them" (Webbs (1910:11-12)).
5. Dii:.' y (1982:17) quotes a petition presented to Parliament in 1836 by laborers who were "dismayed
and disgusted beyond anything they can describe, with the idea of being shut up in one part of a prison
and their wives and children in other separate parts because they are poor through no fault of their own."
6. The Poor Law Commissioners were ambivalent about inmate labor; using labor as punishment for
workhouse inmates would inculcate the wrong attitude toward work in those who, after all, were
supposed to one day leave the institution and become self-supporting workers (Crowther (1981: 196-7)).
7. Relief costs per capita actually fell from 1816-19 to the early 1830s (Digby (1982:9)). The rough
estimates of income per capita were computed using Deane and Coale's estimates of the gross national
income of Great Britain and the population estimates reported in Mitchell (1962:6,366)). Social-insurance
innovations included the Workmen's Compensations Acts (1897 and 1906); the Unemployed Workmen
Act (1905); the Old Age Pensions Act (1908 and 1911); and health insurance (1911).
8. Opponents of reform sometimes charged that the workhouse system was simply a prelude to the
abolition of relief altogether, but this was for most part false (Edsall (1971:20)).
9. Snell's (1985) discussion of the New Poor Law emphasizes this restoration of proper "social relations"
between the classes. In discussing the deleterious effects of the old system on farm laborers, the Royal
Commission claimed that "... the very labourers among whom the farmer has to live, upon whose merits
as workmen, and upon whose affection as friends, he ought to depend, are becoming not merely idle and
ignorant and dishonest, but positively hostile; not merely unfit for his service and indifferent to his
welfare, but actually desirous to injure him" (Royal Commission (1834:68)).
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10. This same sentiment is echoed later in connection with the Crusade Against Outrelief (Chance
(1895:21-23)).
11. See Besley and Coate (1992a) for a formal development of s·ome of these ideas.
12. The shift to the larger Poor Law Unions, another feature of the New Poor Law, made the information
problem if anything worse.

Recall, however, that at first parishes retained all control over relief

decisions.
13. The Webbs present a list of Poor Law Unions with an outdoor labor test as of 1847 (Webb
(1910:322-41)). In most of these cases the Poor Law Board had agreed to the labor test because of
insufficient workhouse facilities.
14. The passage refers to a workhouse system devised by a Reverend Robert Lowe in the parish of
Bingham. Quoted in DeSchweinitz (1947: 122). Himmelfarb (1984: 164-5) makes a similar point.
15. See, for example, Kreps (1990) chapter 17 for an account of the formal structure of such models.
16. This idea of capital as commitment underlies some models of entry deterrence. See, for example,
Dixit (1979). The cost ambiguity applies to marginal cost. Observers were perfectly clear on the point
that the average cost of relief was greater for indoor relief.
17. See Edsall (1971:14-15). William Cobbett, one of the New Poor Law's most influential critics, took
this view.
18. Quoted in DeSchweinitz (1947:120). Fowle (1898:50-52) discusses the very thorough investigation
system in some German cities, and comments that although the system involves an inquiry which "seems
in our English eyes a kind of instrument of mental torture" the system had not succeeded well in keeping
down the rate of pauperism.
19. Mary MacKinnon has pointed out that the areas with the most immigration and in which market
relations had made the greatest inroads - the industrial North - also had the lowest levels of pauperism.
A simple cross-section comparison does not support the notion that the New Poor Law was introduced
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to contend with information problems in the most rapidly-changing regions of England. Our suggestion
in the text is not so much that changes in the information environment brought about the New Poor Law
as an observation that the Elizabethan system was no longer. practical in the nineteenth century.
20. Part of the Crusade Against Outrelief was an effort to extend the prohibition on outdoor relief to
larger classes of paupers.

Henry Longley, an inspector for the Poor Law Board, advocated the

workhouse test for nearly everyone. Consider his opposition to outdoor relief for widows with children.
The widows themselves could be prodded to work, he claimed; and if married men knew the Poor Law
would provide for their families, they would be less likely to buy insurance, join benefit societies, etc.
(Longley ( 1874: 183, 185)). He made a similar argument against outdoor relief for deserted wives: "The
habitual grant of out-relief to applicants of this class, especially among the Irish residents in London, is
very generally believed to encourage and facilitate the desertion of their wives and families by husbands"
(Longley (1874: 187)).
21. This is equally true in modern debates about the reform of welfare programs. See, for example, the
discussion of the impact of workfare programs on teenage child bearing in Kaus (1986).
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Table 1
English Poor Relief, 1840-1914

I

Number on Relief
Per 1,000 Population

I

Indices of Expenditures (1840= 100)

Year

Indoor
Relief

1840

11.0

66.0

100.00

100.00

100.00

1850

7.0

50.4

113.12

107.64

102.82

1860

5.1

35.3

112.87

97.68

92.96

1870

6.4

37.7

186.01

123.95

117.61

1880

6.3

22.9

217.57

92.49

107.04

1890

5.8

18.7

235.15

83.73

98.24

1900

5.9

15.7

315.35

92.05

123.24

1910

7.8

15.2

415.59

114.06

140.49

1914

7.0

10.6

431.81

82.63

139.08

Outdoor
Relief

Indoor
Relief

Outdoor
Relief

All Relief, Head
of Total Population

Source: Official sources, after Williams (1981: Appendix A, B)
Notes: Indoor relief expenditures exclude construction costs and staff salaries. Williams
emphasizes a number of definitional ambiguities and inconsistencies. See MacKinnon (1988) for
detailed discussion of Poor Law statistics.
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